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PETITION FOR REHEARING
The appellants, 6200 South Associates, Roger H. Boyer and Kern
C. Gardner ("Associates") herewith respectfully petition this Court
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 to rehear specific
issues

involved

Cour^ ' r
«

Slip

in

the

Opinion

appeal
of

and

addressed,

part,

in

23,

Upon

f\ ir bher

March

1994.

the

:;c:-ationr t h e S I i p O p i n i o n should b e p a r t i a l l y set a s i d e and

t h e j u d g m e n t o f D i s t r i c t J u d g e B r i a n r e v e r s e d for p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r
in law w i t h t h e c a s e r e m i t t e d t o the D i s t r i c t C o u r t for a 1 lew t:.] :i a 1
issues

Compensation.

This Petition will address only two questions addressed in the
main appeal and in the Opinion of March 23, 1994:
(1)

Did the Slip Opinion misunderstand or misinterpret the
testimony and record of trial that the Clinger testimony,
involving aerial photographs of highway interchanges in
s.j 11 hake mid Davis 1 'ount. i en , Hailed l:o identify a single
property, property access, size, shape, loss of access,
or any factual data, whatsoever, that would have allowed
le expei! to conclude that these wer e "access-comparable
properties"?

1z j

Was the cutting off of Associates 1 cross-examination of
UDOT f s expert: i 1 1 t:l: le 1 ise of 1 iyp otl letical questions on the
most critical and sensitive issue in the entire trial,
prejudicial and not mere harmless error?

'

These sections uf

the Miiirh ?! "I

lll'i'H slip Opinion w e r e , w e

r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t , either factually misunderstood by t h e C o u r t o r
e r r o n e o u s l y applied•

In either event, ~ rehearing is r e q u i r e d to

a v e 1: t a m a 1 1 :i £ e s t: 11 i s c a 1: 11 i a g e o £ j u s t i c e.
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BASES FOR PETITION
The issues raised in this Petition are of grave consequence to
the entire body of law on business and economic damages in this
State particularly in the field of eminent domain.
1.

The

Testimony

On

Undefined

"Comparable

Access"

Properties.
The

issue

admissability

at

of

pp.

7-10

testimony

of

and

the

Slip

aerial

Opinion

photographs

involving
of

totally

unknown properties leaving the court and jury to speculate as to
how and in what manner access restrictions, if any, were comparable
to the access restrictions of the subject property, is of immense
importance

to

the

analysis

testimony in this State.
voir

dire

or

and

development

of

expert

damage

When an expert is confronted, either on

cross-examination,

as

to

an

alleged

basis

of

comparability, viz., in this case, access-comparability of another
property of which he has told the jury on direct examination, and
the witness admits that he knows nothing of the property, its
access

characteristic,

its size, its ownership,

its

use,

its

impaired use vis-a-vis the freeway interchange, that testimony
cannot stand.

The reason is simple but profound . . . it requires

the jury, as well as the Court, to speculate and conjecture as to
just how this allegedly "access-comparable property" is, in fact,
comparable.

The witness, dinger, had not even seen the so-called

access-comparable properties except by an aerial view.
If the Court permits this evidence to pass muster under the
feckless

statement

of

the

witness

that

he

"considered

the

photographs as part of his larger appraisal", the Court will have
driven a splitting wedge into the solid oak precedent that an
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expert

must

at

characteristics

least
as

a

be

able

predicate

to

identify

for

the

basic

opinion

property

on

access-

comparability .
2.

Cross-Examination Is Harmless Error.

As to the issue of whether being blocked out from crossexamining

an

expert

witness

as

to

a

series

of

hypothetical

questions is prejudicial (Slip Op. at 10-12), the Court should look
at the impact that its decision will have upon the trial Bar of
this State.

When a jury is told that hypothetical

questions

testing the accuracy of the expert's opinion is inadmissible and
trial counsel is placed under a virtual quarantine of pursuing
hypothetical questions on the most critical question in the entire
case,

can

it

be

genuinely

said

examination was not prejudicial?

that

the

preclusion

of

the

Would this new rule of "harmless

error of hypothetical questions on cross-examination" apply to
criminal cases as well as civil?

This Court has recognized the

principle of law that full and open cross-examination is the sine
qua non of a fair hearing, particularly of trained and wise experts
who have been schooled in the art of socratic examination?

What

message does the Slip Opinion send to a party the size of UDOT to
make a baseless, almost fatuous, objection to disrupt critical
cross-exam

. . .

it may be worth a try because, even though

erroneous, it could be swept under the carpet as harmless and de
minimis error.
These issues are of extraordinary importance to the Bench and
the trial Bar of this State and, it is submitted,
addressed on rehearing.
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should

be

SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM
I
THE CLINGER TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE ON AERIAL
PHOTOGRAPHS OF ALLEGEDLY COMPARABLE ACCESS PROPERTIES
On page 7 of the Slip Op., the panel addresses the issue of
dinger's testimony surrounding aerial photographs of properties on
freeway

interchanges

which

supposedly

had

comparable

access

restrictions to the remanent access of the subject property AFTER
condemnation.

The Court cited Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui

Investment, Inc. , 522 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1974), on the question of the
evidentiary

foundation

to

meet

the

test

of

"reasonable

comparability," but distinguished Mitsui from the instant case
because it dealt with "comparable sales" (italicized by the Court
in

the

Mitsui

quote)

UDOTf s

whereas

expert

only

used

the

photographs to establish "comparable access limitations."
The panel Opinion then states, even assuming the application
of the Mitsui principle, there appeared to be sufficient foundation
in regard to the photographed properties establishing "reasonable
comparability" of access and configuration.

Thus, the Opinion

winds up on the note that with wide latitude given to expert
appraisers to determine fair market value, the trial court did not
err

in

admitting

the

photographs

of

the

"comparable

access

properties."
The

Court

will

search

the

entire

record

of

dinger's

examination in vain to find one scrap of evidence in which the
witness,

in describing

the location of the properties on the

freeway interchanges, could identify a single property that had
access characteristics at all, much less those that were reasonably
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comparable to that of the access remaining to the subject property.
What this record will show plainly is that the witness Clinger, on
voir dire and cross-examination,
could not identify any particular or a
property claimed to be access-comparable;

single

could not identify the configuration or the nature
of the access to a single property
in
the
photographs;
could not identify how the properties
photographs were accessed, if at all, from
or insular roads;
could not identify even so
ownership in the photographs;

much

as

. ;i the
>rimary

a

single

could not identify whether any of the properties
had been partially taken by UDOT and all the
primary access expropriated as in the subject case;
could not identify whether the photographs showed
properties which had been impacted by
access
restrictions due to interchange construction;
could not identify whether the properties had been
rezoned, downzoned, or their highest and best use
changed as a consequence of access limitations.
In short, Clinger could not tell Judge Brian and the
anything
size,

at all

shape,

about

use,

any properties,

difficulties

photographed properties.
All

Clinger

knew

was

of

access

use,

situs,

or

jury

ownership,

u-

ne

Clinger knew nothing of them, whatsoever.

that

there

were

some

unknown,

undefined

properties with undefined access near interchanges in Salt Lake and
Da\ :l s Coui i t::I e s .

.' -. '

, '

How can this Court possibly say
absence

of

a scintilla

of

evidence

•" ' .,,
'r light of this conspicuous
as

to what

properties

the

" 11 ti less was ev ei 1 1:a] k:l i ig aboi i t, tl lat ai 1 "adequate i jundation" was
laid

for

admissibility?

Does

not

the

conclusioi1

in

the

Slip

Opinion as to this critical issue send a message to UDOT and every
6

other government agency (as well as property owners) that an expert
can simply get up and show photographs of an area including a
polyglot of unknown properties without being able to tell the Court
and jury a single fact as to any of the photographed properties or
characteristics that are access-comparable. If permitted to stand,
the Slip Opinion will be read as establishing a new rule in Utah
overturning authority stemming back to the 1961 case of State Road
Comm'n v. Peterson, 12 Utah.2d 317, 366 P.2d 76 (1961).

It will

open up a flood gate for incompetent testimony to be masqueraded
before a court and jury under the guise of expert evidence.
If the witness, Clinger, had identified and given appropriate
foundation for the properties and delineated the access limitations
which those properties had vis-a-vis the freeway interchange, a
"sale"

would

not

be

required

transaction to be admissible.
purpose

of

establishing

in

order

the

photographed

It could have come in evidence for

"comparability

comparability of sale value.

for

of

access"

vis-a-vis

But Clinger had not a scintilla of

information about the properties.

It is this turn key issue which

the Panel Opinion may have misunderstood or did not fully consider.
It should do so on Reconsideration.
II
THE EXCLUSION OF HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF UDOTfS EXPERT, VAN DREMMELIN, WAS
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL AND REQUIRES, ITSELF, A NEW TRIAL
The art of cross-examination of an expert witness is sensitive
and difficult business.

It is the crown jewel of the trial lawyer

and the only effective means that he or she has to penetrate the
glorious

achievements

and medals of the expert witness.

The

apotheosis of the expert is direct exam where he parades his resume
7

and infinite experience.
truth is at hand.

It is cross-examination when the hour of

The effectiveness of that cross depends not only

upon mouthing any question at any time on a particular subject, but
the articulacy, timing and context of the question are of vital
importance.
Van Dremmelin was a seemingly skilled, polished and effective
witness who came into the courtroom after 4 days of trial and told
the jury that the Associates1 property was actually better-off
because of the condemnation of all of its primary access to the
north and west, then it was prior to condemnation.
monstrous

claim

and

one

that

had

to

be

met

with

This was a
the

most

scrutinizing and effective cross-examination. What the trial court
did was not only to cut-off hypothetical questions

on cross-

examination by Associates' counsel, but in doing so, effectively
admonished the jury that hypothetical questions involving assumed
properties not before the trial court, were irrelevant and not to
be considered in giving weight to the evidence.

The hypothetical

question of counsel for 6200 South Associates, at the time UD0T f s
objection was sustained, was a prelude to a line of examination of
hypotheticals in which one principle built on a previous principle
and so on. Had the cross-examination been permitted (as this Court
said it should), Van Dremmelin would have been forced to concede
that the loss of all primary access with only back-door ingress and
egress left after condemnation was a severe restriction in the
typical case.

What made this property atypical, would have been

the concluding question.

But that was cut-off by the trial judge

sustaining the UDOT objection, an objection which this Court found
to be plainly erroneous.
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Certainly if the area of cross-examination that was blockedout involved a preliminary or relatively unimportant issue, there
would be the basis for a possible finding of "harmless error" in
the overall context of the full trial.

But that is not this case.

The area in which cross-examination was blocked was in the most
critical and sensitive area of the entire case -- what had happened
to this property as a result of all of its primary access having
been condemned.

Limitation of cross-examination on this epic issue

was highly prejudicial and damaging, at the least.
It will not do, we respectfully submit, to say that some
cross-examination ultimately was allowed as to a non-hypothetical
property.

To a minor degree, the Panel Opinion's observation is

correct.

But to a major degree, it is fundamentally inaccurate

because the hypothetical could not be fully constructed in the
later example.

The precedent of the Supreme Court in State v.

Peek, 265 P.2d 630, 637 (1953) must weigh overwhelmingly on this
point:
There is no other instrument so well adapted to discovery
of the truth as cross-examination, and as long as it
tends to disclose the truth it should never be curtailed
or limited. (Emphasis added).
Is it to be the law of this Court that Peek doesn't mean what
it says and that when cross is blockaded by objection on the
critical question of the trial, the matter falls in that dismal
catalogue of harmless error?

We respectfully submit not.

CONCLUSION
Associates recognizes that Petitions for Rehearing are not
favored.

But the issues raised in this Petition are essential and

if permitted to stand under the Slip Opinion, will present great
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difficulties for the Bench and Bar relative to the foundation for
expert testimony and the genuine importance of cross-examination of
an expert.
It

is

respectfully

submitted

that

a rehearing

should

be

granted as to the two issues raised in this Petition and that upon
rehearing, the Judgment of the District Court should be reversed as
to

both

issues

and

the

case

remitted

for

a

new

trial

on

compensation and damages.
DATED this

day of April 1994.
Respectfully Submitted

ROBERT S. CAMPBI
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON
of and for
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
Attorneys
for
Defendants
and
Appellants 6200 South Associates, H.
Roger Boyer and Kern C. Gardner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in
said

capacity

and

pursuant

to

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, true and correct copies of the 6200 South Associates'
Petition for Rehearing & Supporting Memorandum were served upon:
Donald S.
Assistant
236 State
Salt Lake

Coleman, Esq.
Attorney General
Capitol Building
City, UT 84114
i

-tk.
by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this £
day of April 1994.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
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